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We study the synthesis of circuits for succinct safety specifications given in the AIG format. We show
how AIG safety specifications can be decomposed automatically into sub-specifications. Then we
propose symbolic compositional algorithms to solve the synthesis problem compositionally starting
for the sub-specifications. We have evaluated the compositional algorithms on a set of benchmarks
including those proposed for the first synthesis competition organised in 2014 by the Synthesis Work-
shop affiliated to the CAV conference. We show that a large number of benchmarks can be decom-
posed automatically and solved more efficiently with the compositional algorithms that we propose
in this paper.
1 Introduction
We study the synthesis of circuits for succinct safety specifications given in the AIG format. An AIG
file for synthesis describes a circuit that compactly defines a transition relation between valuations for
latches, uncontrollable and controllable input signals. The circuit contains a special latch called the error
latch. Initially, all latches are false, and the controller chooses values for the controllable input signals so
as to always keep the error latch low (safety objective), no matter how the environment chooses values
for the uncontrollable input signals. The AIG format is monolithic in the sense that it is not explicitly
structured into subsystems. This is unfortunate as in general, complex systems or specifications are built
of smaller sub-parts and taking into account this structure may be a definite advantage.
And-Inverter Graphs (AIG) have been proposed as a way to provide a simple and compact file format
for a model checking competition affiliated to CAV 2007 (see http://fmv.jku.at/aiger/FORMAT).
This format has been extended to be the input format for the 2014 reactive synthesis competition. Because
the synthesis competition uses the AIG format, and this format is monolithic, all the tools that took part
in the 2014 reactive synthesis competition solved the synthesis problems monolithically. Nevertheless,
the specifications that were proposed during the 2014 synthesis competition are, for a large part of them,
generated from higher level descriptions of systems that bear structure. For example, two of the most
interesting sets of benchmarks, GenBuf and AMBA, are generated from Reactive(1) specifications (a
tractable subset of LTL specifications) [3], or directly from LTL specifications that are conjunctions of
smaller LTL sub-formulas.
In this paper, we show that part of the structure lost during the AIG format translation can be re-
covered and used to solve the synthesis problem compositionally. First, we propose a static analysis of
the AIG file that returns, when possible, a decomposition of the circuit into smaller sub-circuits with
their own safety specifications. Then we provide three different algorithms that first solve the sub-games
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corresponding to the sub-circuits and then aggregate, following three different heuristics, the results ob-
tained on the sub-games. Namely, once we have the solution of all the sub-games we aggregate them by
(i) taking their intersection – which, we show, over-approximates the actual solution of the general game
– and applying the usual fixpoint algorithm to it; (ii) assigning a score to each pair of solutions based
on the number of variables shared and the size of the BDDs obtained after their intersection and using
said score to aggregate (pair by pair) all the solutions; (iii) trying to refine them using information from
a single step of the fixpoint computation on the general game (i.e.projecting the resulting “bad” states
onto each sub-game). We have implemented the decomposition, the compositional synthesis algorithms,
and evaluated the approach on the 2014 reactive synthesis competition benchmarks as well as on new
benchmarks produced from large LTL specifications.
Related Work. In [9, 10], compositional algorithms are proposed for the LTL realizability problem.
The LTL formulas considered there are assumed to be conjunctions of smaller LTL formulas, and so the
structure of the specification is directly available to them, while in our case it has to be recovered. Also,
the main data-structures used there are based on antichains while we use BDDs. In symbolic model
checking algorithms, partitioned transition relations [6] are widely used whenever the system is made
of several components. Here, the goal is to compute the one-step successor states without explicitly
computing the conjunction of the transition relations for each component. The image computation is
rather done using quantification scheduling heuristics which tries to apply variable quantification as
early as possible inside the conjunction; see e.g. [16]. We also use partitioned transition relations in our
algorithms: the next-state function for each latch is stored separately. Unlike forward model checking
algorithms, synthesis algorithms proceed backwards, so we can use the composition operation provided
by BDD libraries to compute predecessors, and we do not need any early quantification heuristics.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we fix notation and recall the definitions needed to present our
results. Then, in Section 3, we describe the class of decompositions our algorithms accept as input, we
give some examples of how to decompose a succinct safety specification given by an extended AIGER
file and outline the algorithm we implemented to get such a decomposition. Our algorithms are described
in detail in Section 4 and the results of our tests are presented in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Let B = {0,1}. Given a set of variables A, a valuation over A is an element of BA, and a set of val-
uations over A is represented by its characteristic function f : BA → B. We will write f (A) to make
the dependency on the variables A explicit. Given two disjoint sets of variables A,B, let us write BA,B
for BA ×BB. Consider variable sets A ⊆ B. We define the projection of a valuation v : BB to A as
v ↓A: BA, with v ↓A (a) = 1 if, and only if v(a) = 1. We extend this notation to functions f : BB→ B by
f ↓A: BA→ B, defined as f ↓A (v) if, and only if ∃v′ ∈ BB, f (v′), and v = v′ ↓A. We define the lifting of a
set f : BA→ B in BB by f ↑B (v) = 1 if, and only if f (v ↓A) = 1. For a set of variables A = {a1,a2, . . .},
let us write A′ = {a′1,a′2, . . .} the set of primed variables. For f (A), let f (A′) denote the characteristic
function f (A) where each variable a ∈ A has been renamed as its primed copy a′ ∈ A′.
Symbolic Games. We formalize the reactive synthesis problem as a two-player turn-based game with
safety objective described symbolically. We consider games defined by sequential synchronous circuits,
encoded in the AIGER format. More precisely, a game is a tuple G = 〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L,err〉, where:
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1. Xu,Xc,L are finite disjoint sets of Boolean variables representing uncontrollable inputs, control-
lable inputs, and latches respectively;
2. for each latch l ∈ L, fl : BL×BXu×BXc → B is the transition function that gives the valuation of l
in the next step. In practice these functions will be given by And-Inverter Graphs (see below for a
definition).
3. err∈ L is a distinguished latch which indicates whether an error has occurred. We will often modify
the circuit by replacing ferr by some other Boolean function e, which we denote by G[ ferr← e].
A state q of game G is a valuation of latches, that is an element of BL. A valuation v in game G is
a valuation of latches and inputs, that is an element of BL,Xu,Xc . We denote the global transition function
δ : BL×BXu×BXc → BL such that δ (v)(l) = fl(v) for each latch l. An execution from valuation v of the
game G is a sequence of valuations (vi)i∈N ∈
(
BL,Xu,Xc
)ω such that v0 = v and for all i,
vi+1 ↓L= δ (vi ↓L,vi ↓Xu ,vi ↓Xc).
The execution is safe if, for all i≥ 0, we have that vi(err) = 0.
Note that symbolic games define game arenas of exponential size but we will only work on their
symbolic representations.
Controller synthesis. The goal of controller synthesis is to find a strategy to determine the controllable
inputs given uncontrollable inputs and the current state (i.e., valuation of the latches) to ensure that the
error state is not reachable. A strategy is a function λ : BL,Xu → BXc . An execution (vi)i∈N is compatible
with λ if for all i ∈ N,
vi ↓Xc= λ (vi ↓L,vi ↓Xu).
A strategy λ is winning if all executions that are compatible with λ are safe. A valuation v is winning
if there exists a strategy λ that is winning from v. We denote W (L,Xu,Xc) the winning valuations of G,
that is the set of valuations that are winning.
And-Inverter Graphs. An And-Inverter Graph (AIG) is a directed acyclic graph with two-input nodes
representing logical conjunction (AND gates), terminal nodes representing inputs, and edges that are
possibly inverted to denote logical negation (NOT gate). Formally, an AIG is a tuple G = 〈V,E, ι〉
such that (V,E) is a directed graph with every vertex having 0 or 2 outgoing edges, and ι : E → B
labels inverted edges with 1. We depict edges (not) labelled by ι as arrows (not) marked with a dark
dot. Figure 1 shows a simple AIG with Boolean variables x1,x2,x3,x4. Each node in the AIG defines
a Boolean function. For example, v1 defines the Boolean function ϕv1 ≡ x1 ∧¬ϕv2 , where ϕv2 is the
corresponding formula defined by v2, since the edge from v1 to v2 is marked as inverted.
The AIGER format (http://fmv.jku.at/aiger/FORMAT) was defined as a standard file format
to describe sequential synchronous circuits (the logic defined as an AIG), and has been used in model
checking and synthesis competitions. In the latter case, the inputs are partitioned into controllable and
uncontrollable (http://www.syntcomp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Format.pdf). This is
the format that we will assume as representation of the input game for our algorithms. We call an AIG
game, a symbolic game described in the AIGER format.
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Binary Decision Diagrams. Internally, our tool uses binary decision diagrams (BDD) [5] to represent
Boolean functions used to represent sets of states or (parts of) transition relations. We use classical
operations and notation on BDDs and refer the interested reader to [1] for a gentle introduction to BDDs.
Projection and lifting of functions are easily implemented with BDDs: projecting is done by an existential
quantification and lifting is a trivial operation because it only extends the domain of the function but its
logical representation, i.e. its Boolean formula, stays the same.
In our algorithms, we often use BDD operations which implement heuristics to reduce the size of the
given BDD, namely, generalized cofactors [12,15]. A generalized cofactor fˆ (X) of f (X) with respect to
g(X) yields a BDD that matches f (X) inside g(X), and is defined arbitrarily outside g(X). This degree of
freedom outside g(X) allows heuristics to reduce the BDD size. We write fˆ (X)= f (X)⇓ g(X). Formally,
we have that fˆ (X)∧g(X) = f (X)∧g(X) and fˆ has at most the size of f . BDD libraries implement the
operations restrict or constrain (see, e.g. [13]), which are specific generalized cofactors.
Classical Algorithms to Solve Safety Games. We recall the basic fixpoint computation for solving
safety games, applied here on symbolic safety games. Let G = 〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L,err〉 be a symbolic
game. The complement of the set W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓L can be computed by iterating an uncontrollable prede-
cessors operator. For any set of states S(L), the uncontrollable predecessors of S is defined as
upreG(S) = {q ∈ BL | ∃xu ∈ BXu . ∀xc ∈ BXc : δ (q,xu,xc) ∈ S};
the dual controllable predecessors operator is defined as
cpreG(S) = {q ∈ BL | ∀xu ∈ BXu . ∃xc ∈ BXc : δ (q,xu,xc) ∈ S};
We denote by upre∗G(S) = µX .(S∪upreG(X)), the least fixpoint of the function F : X → S∪upreG(X)
in the µ-calculus notation (see [8]). Note that F is defined on the powerset lattice, which is finite. It
follows from Tarski-Knaster theorem [14] that, because F is monotonic, the fixpoint exists and can be
computed by iterating the application of F starting from any value below it, e.g.the least value of the
lattice. Similarly, we denote by cpre∗G(S) = νX .(S∩ cpreG(X)), the greatest fixpoint of the function
F : X → S∩ cpreG(X)). Dually, we have that, because F is monotonic, the fixpoint exists and can be
computed by iterating the application of F starting from any value above it, e.g.the greatest value of
the lattice. When G is clear from the context, we simply write upre (cpre) instead of upreG (cpreG).
The Proposition follows from well-known results about the relationship between safety games and these
operators (see, e.g., [2]).
Proposition 1. For any symbolic game G = 〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L,err〉, we have
• cpre∗((err 7→ 0) ↑L) = cpre(W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓L); dually,
• upre∗((err 7→ 1) ↑L) = ¬cpre(W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓L) = upre(¬W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓L).
In the rest of the paper, we assume a black-box procedure solve_vals which, for a given symbolic
game, computes the corresponding winning valuations. In practice, solve_vals can be implemented
using upre or cpre. Formally,
solve_vals(G) = {(q,xu,xc) ∈ BL,Xu,Xc | q(err) = 0∧δ (q,xu,xc) 6∈ cpre∗((err 7→ 0)↑L)}.
Note that solve_vals gives the set of winning valuations, and not the set of winning states. The interpre-
tation of solve_vals(G) is that it is the maximal permissive strategy: any strategy for the controller that
ensures to stay within this set is a winning strategy. We also consider procedure solve_states(G) =
{q ∈ BL | q ∈ cpre∗ ((err 7→ 0)↑L)} which returns the set of winning states.
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Optimizations Using Generalized Cofactors. Let us now establish the correctness of two optimiza-
tions we use in the sequel.
We first formalize the dependence on latches as follows. The cone of influence (see, e.g., [7]) of ei,
written cone(ei), is the set of variables on which ei depends, that is, cone(Φ) ⊆ L∪ Xu ∪ Xc is the
minimal set of variables such that if x ∈ cone(Φ) then either (∃x : Φ) 6⇔ Φ or x ∈ cone( fy) for some
y ∈ cone(Φ)∩L. For convenience, we denote by coneL(Φ) the set cone(Φ)∩L.
Observe that we have defined the cone of influence of a Boolean function semantically. That is to
say, a variable x is in the cone of influence of a function Φ if and only if the set of valuations satisfying Φ
changes for some fixed valuation of x. Since we consider functions given by AIGs, the cone of influence
can be over-approximated by exploring the AIG starting from the vertex corresponding to function Φ,
adding all latches and inputs visited and the cones of influence of the latches – computed recursively.
In our implementation we use this over-approximation when working on the AIG only and we use the
definition on the semantics to obtain an algorithm on BDDs – which we use when working with BDDs.
Given an over-approximation Λ of the winning valuations (i) we first simplify the transition relation
and keep it precise only in Λ, (ii) we further modify the transition relation by making every transition not
allowed by Λ go to an error state, i.e.change ferr. In fact, correctness of the first optimization requires that
the second one be used as well. The following result summarizes the properties of these optimizations.
Lemma 1. For any symbolic game G = 〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L,err〉, and any Λ(L,Xu,Xc) ⊇W (L,Xu,Xc), if
we write f ′l = fl ⇓ Λ for all l ∈ L, we have
solve_vals(G) = solve_vals(〈coneL(Λ),Xu,Xc,( f ′l )l∈coneL(Λ)〉[ f ′err←¬Λ]) ↑L .
Proof. We first show that solving the game with error function ¬Λ yields the same winning valuations
as for ferr. For that we will use two basic properties of the winning valuations: first if f ⊆ f ′ then
solve_vals(G[ ferr← f ′])⊆ solve_vals(G[ ferr← f ]);
secondly
solve_vals(G[ ferr←¬solve_vals(G)]) = solve_vals(G),
this is because if an execution compatible with strategy λ reaches ¬solve_vals(G), then by defini-
tion of winning valuations it can be extended from there to an execution compatible with λ that is
unsafe. Together with the fact that ferr ⊆ ¬Λ ⊆ ¬W , these properties imply that solve_vals(G) =
solve_vals(G[ ferr ← ¬Λ]). It is clear that one can consider only the variables in coneL(Λ) for this
computation, and thus considering H = (〈coneL(Λ),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(Λ)〉[ ferr←¬Λ]), we have
solve_vals(G) = solve_vals(H) ↑L .
It remains to show that the same set solve_vals(H) is obtained when the functions f ′l are used
transition functions fl . Let us denote G′ = (〈coneL(Λ),Xu,Xc,( f ′l )l∈coneL(Λ)〉[ f ′err←¬Λ]). We note that,
for any u⊇ ¬Λ, the following holds:
upre′G(u)∪u = upreH(u)∪u.
Hence, it is straightforward to show by induction that solve_vals(H) = solve_vals(G′).
R. Brenguier et al. 103
v1
x1 v2
x2
x3 x4
Figure 1: Example AIG
3 Decomposing the Specification
In this section, we describe how we decompose the error function ferr of a given symbolic game into a
disjunction i.e. ferr ≡
(∨
1≤i≤n ei
)
. Notice that if a strategy λ (L,Xu,Xc) ensures that ferr is never true
then it also ensures that ei is never true. We will then give algorithms that solve the game where each ei
is seen as the error function, and combine the obtained solutions into a global solution.
The rationale behind this approach is that the functions ei do not depend on all latches in general, so
solving the game for ei is often efficient.
Sub-game. Given a decomposition of ferr, we define a sub-game Gi by replacing the error function by
ei and considering only variables in its cone of influence. Formally, we write
Gi = 〈coneL(ei),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(ei)〉[ ferr← ei].
We will often use the notation G[ ferr← ei], which consists in replacing the function ferr by ei. In practice,
the size of the symbolic representation of the sub-games are often significantly smaller than that of the
original game. Recall also that winning all the sub-games is necessary to win the global game. We
write Wi(coneL(ei),Xu,Xc) for the winning valuations of Gi. In the implementation, Si and Si ↑L are
represented by the same BDD.
Example 1. Consider the AIG shown in Figure 1 where x1,x2,x3,x4 are all input variables. We would
like to decompose the function defined by the sub-tree rooted at v1 (i.e. the whole tree) which we will
denote by ϕv1 . It should be clear that ϕv1 ≡ x1∧¬ϕv2 where ϕv2 is the function defined by the sub-tree
rooted at v2. In turn, we also have that ϕv2 ≡ x2∧¬x3∧ x4. If we distribute the disjunction from ¬ fv2 we
get that ϕv1 ≡ (x1∧¬x2)∨ (x1∧ x3)∨ (x1∧¬x4). Thus, one possible decomposition of ϕv1 would be to
take e1 = x∧¬x2, e2 = x1∧ x3, and e3 = x1∧¬x4.
The general steps followed in Example 1 above can be generalized into an algorithm which outputs a
decomposition of the error function whenever one exists. Intuitively, the algorithm consists in exploring
all non-inverted edges of the AIG graph from the vertex which defines the error function. If there are
no inverted edges which stopped the exploration, or if all of them lead to leaves, the error function is
in fact a conjunction of Boolean variables and can clearly not be decomposed. Otherwise, there is at
least one inverted edge leading to a node representing an AND gate. In this case, we can push the
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negation one level down and obtain a disjunction which can be distributed to obtain our decomposition.
Algorithm 2 details the procedure we have implemented. It takes as input an AIG, whether the error
function is inverted, and the vertex verr which defines the error function. It outputs a set of functions
whose conjunction is logically equivalent to the error function.
We have kept our description of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 (called by the former) informal.
Algorithm 1: get_minput_and(V,E, ι ,v0)
1 to_visit := {v0};
2 pos := {};
3 neg := {};
4 while |to_visit|> 0 do
5 Pop u ∈ to_visit;
6 if u is not a leaf then
7 Let e = (u,v) and e′ = (u,v′) be s.t. e,e′ ∈ E;
8 if ι(e) = 1 then
9 neg := neg∪{v};
10 else
11 to_visit := to_visit ∪{v};
12 if ι(e′) = 1 then
13 neg := neg∪{v};
14 else
15 to_visit := to_visit ∪{v};
16 else
17 pos := pos∪{u};
18 return (pos,neg)
Algorithm 2: decompose(V,E, ι , inv,verr)
1 (pos,neg) := get_minput_and(V,E, ι ,verr);
2 if inv = 1 then
3 return {¬ϕv | v ∈ pos}∪{ϕv | v ∈ neg}
4 if inv = 0 and all v ∈ neg are leaves then
5 return {ϕverr}; /* No decomposition possible */
6 Take v0 ∈ argmax{||get_minput_and(V,E, ι ,v)|| | v ∈ neg}; /* where ||(S1,S2)|| := |S1|+ |S2| */
7 res :=
∧
u∈posϕu∧
∧
v∈neg\{v0}¬ϕv;
8 (pos,neg) := get_minput_and(V,E, ι ,v0);
9 return {res∧ (¬ϕv) | v ∈ pos}∪{res∧ϕv | v ∈ neg}
Example 2. Consider a formula given by a set of assumption formulas {Ai(L,Xu) | 1≤ i≤ n} and a set
of guarantees {G j(L,Xu,Xc) | 1≤ j ≤ m}.1 The system we want to synthesize is expected to determine
the controllable inputs in way such that if the assumptions are true, then the guarantees are met. This is
formally stated as Equation 1.
Φ=
( ∧
1≤i≤n
Ai
)
=⇒ ( ∧
1≤ j≤m
G j
)
(1)
1This is actually the way in which the error formula is stated for, e.g., the AMBA benchmarks.
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Figure 2: One possible AIG for Equation 1
A natural decomposition for the error function ¬Φ would be the following: ∨1≤ j≤m (¬G j ∧∧1≤i≤n Ai).
If ¬Φ were given as the AIG depicted in Figure 2, then it is not hard too see that Algorithm 2 would
yield a very similar decomposition. Indeed, as we have not assumed anything in particular about the
formulas Ai and G j we cannot tell whether Algorithm 1 will explore beyond each G j, thus giving us
more sub-games than the proposed decomposition. However, in practice, this is even better as smaller
sub-games usually depend on less variables. This, in turn, could lead to them being easier to solve.
Lemma 2. For each sub-game Gi with new error function ei, we have that
W (L,Xu,Xc)⊆ (Wi ↑L)(L,Xu,Xc).
Proof. For each valuation v′ ∈W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc , we select a valuation v ∈W (L,Xu,Xc). Let
λv be a winning strategy in G from v. Since there is no losing outcome for λv, for all xu ∈ BXu ,
λv(δ (v),xu) is such that (δ (v),xu,λv(δ (v),xu)) ∈W (L,Xu,Xc). For all xu ∈ BXu , we fix λ ′(δ (v′),xu)
to be λv(δ (v),xu). We have that (δ (v′),xu,λ ′(δ (v′),xu)) ∈W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc because the tran-
sition relations of G and Gi coincide on coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc. The strategy λ ′ ensures that any execution
which starts in W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc stays inside W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc . Since ei evaluates
to false on W (L,Xu,Xc), these states are not error states in Gi. Therefore λ ′ is winning for all states in
W (L,Xu,Xc) ↓coneL(ei)∪Xu∪Xc . This implies that Wi contains the projection of all winning states of G and
therefore W ⊆Wi ↑L.
4 Compositional Algorithms
In this section, we give three algorithms to solve AIG games compositionally. Each algorithm first solves
the sub-games, and then combines the solutions using different heuristics. We denote by decompose the
procedure that implements the decomposition of ferr described in Section 3, and returns the set of error
functions ei. In all three algorithms, we start by solving each sub-game and obtaining the winning
valuations Wi(L,Xu,Xc), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. These steps are given in lines 1–3, and are common to ll our
algorithms; we assume that solve_vals raises an exception and terminates the program if the sub-game
cannot be won. Otherwise, we aggregate the results and solve the global game; for the latter, we adopt a
different approach in each of the three algorithms.
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Algorithm 3: comp_1(〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L〉)
1 {e1, . . . ,en} := decompose( ferr); /* Formulas ei(L,Xu,Xc) s.t. ferr ≡∨1≤i≤n ei */
2 for 1≤ i≤ n do
3 wi(L,Xu,Xc) := solve_vals(〈coneL(ei),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(ei)[ ferr← ei]〉)↑L,Xu,Xc ;
4 Λ(L,Xu,Xc) :=
∧
1≤i≤n wi(L,Xu,Xc);
5 for l ∈ coneL(Λ) do f ′l (L,Xu,Xc) := fl(L,Xu,Xc) ⇓ Λ(L,Xu,Xc) return
solve_vals(〈coneL(Λ),Xu,Xc,( f ′l )l∈coneL(Λ)〉[ f ′err←¬Λ])↑L,Xu,Xc ;
4.1 Global aggregation
In Algorithm 3, we start by computing the intersection of the winning valuations: Λ=
∧
1≤i≤nWi. In fact,
any valuation that is not in Λ is losing in one of the sub-games; thus in the global game. Conversely, a
strategy that stays in Λ is winning for each sub-game. Therefore, we solve the global game with the new
safety objective of avoiding ¬Λ. Before solving the global game, the algorithm attempts to reduce the
size of the transition relations by virtue of Lemma 1.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 3 computes the winning valuations of the given AIG game.
Proof. We prove first that W ⊆Λ (that is for all valuation v, W (v)⇒Λ(v)). Since ¬ei⊇W (L,Xu,Xc), we
get – by Lem. 1 – that each wi(L,Xu,Xc) is Wi ↑L where Wi is the winning valuations of the sub-game Gi.
If q 6∈ Λ(L,Xu,Xc), there is a sub-game Gi such that pii(q) is not winning. By Lem. 2, this implies that q
is not winning in G, hence q 6∈W (L,Xu,Xc).
From Lem. 1 it then follows that solve_vals(G) = solve_vals(G′) ↑L and therefore the algorithm
computes the correct result.
4.2 Incremental aggregation
Algorithm 4: comp_2(〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L〉,α,β ,γ)
1 {e1, . . . ,en} := decompose( ferr); /* Formulas ei(L,Xu,Xc) s.t. ferr ≡∨1≤i≤n ei */
2 for 1≤ i≤ n do
3 wi(L,Xu,Xc) := solve_vals(〈coneL(ei),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(ei)[ ferr← ei]〉)↑L,Xu,Xc ;
4 E := {wi | 1≤ i≤ n};
5 while |E|> 1 do
6
(r,s) := argmax(i, j)∈|E|2:i6= j {α ·bddsize(¬(wi∧w j))
+β |coneL(wi)∩coneL(w j)|
+γ|coneL(wi)∪coneL(w j)|};
7 for l ∈ coneL(wr ∧ws) do f ′l (L,Xu,Xc) := fl(L,Xu,Xc) ⇓ (wr ∧ws) w(L,Xu,Xc) :=
solve_vals(〈coneL(wr ∧ws),Xu,Xc,( f ′l )l∈coneL(wr∧ws)〉[ ferr←¬wr ∨¬ws])↑L,Xu,Xc ;
8 Remove wr,ws and add w to E;
9 return last w(L,Xu,Xc) ∈ E;
In Algorithm 4, we aggregate the results of the sub-games incrementally: given the list of winning
valuations wi for the sub-games, at each iteration, we choose and remove two sub-games i and j, solve
their conjunction (as in Algorithm 3, with error function ¬(wi∧w j)), and add the newly obtained winning
valuations back in the list. To choose the sub-games, we use the following heuristics; we assign a score to
each pair of sub-games based on the size of the BDD of the error function ¬(wi∧w j), and on the number
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of shared latches, and the number of the latches that appear in either of the sub-games. Intuitively, we
prefer to work with small BDDs, and to merge sub-games that share a lot of latches, while yielding a
small number of total latches. We thus use a linear combination at line 6 to choose the best scoring pair.
In our experiments, we used α =−2,β = 1,γ =−1.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 4 computes the winning valuations of the given AIG game.
Proof. Let us denote by wi1, . . . ,w
i
ni the content of E at the beginning of iteration i. We define a function
F from winning valuations wij to subsets of {1, . . . ,n}. Intuitively, F(wij) is the set of sub-games that
were solved to obtain wij. For instance, at the first iteration, if sub-games r,s are combined – and the
result, w, is added to E – then we get F(w) = {r,s}. For convenience, we assume that w is appended at
the end of the sequence wi1, . . . ,w
i
ni at line 8.
We proceed by induction on i to define F . Initially F(w1i ) = {i} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For i > 1, for
all j 6= r,s, the element wij remains in the list so F is already defined on wij. For the newly element wini
we let F(wini) = F(w
i−1
r )∪F(wi−1s ).
We claim that at any iteration i, wij is the winning valuations of the game whose error function is the
disjunction of the negation of the winning valuations of the sub-games in F(wij). More precisely,
wij = solve_vals(〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L〉[ ferr←
∨
k∈F(wij)
ek]).
The correctness of the algorithm will follow since the sets F(·) are merged at each iteration, and the
algorithm always stops with |E|= 1 and F(w) = {1, . . . ,n}.
The condition holds initially as shown in Theorem 1. Let i > 1. As shown in Lem. 1, the generalized
cofactor operation applied before the call to solve does not affect the returned set. Let us denote Er =∨
k∈F(wi−1r ) ek and Es =
∨
k∈F(wi−1s ) es. Let us write E = Er ∨Es. We have Er ⇒ ¬wr by induction, and
similarly Es⇒¬ws; thus E ⇒¬wr∨¬ws. Moreover, for any q(L,Xu) if the controller plays strategy xu ∈
BXc with¬wr(q,xu), or¬ws(q,xu), then he loses for the error function defined by E . In other terms, ¬wr∨
¬ws is a subset of losing valuations for error function E , and contains E , the set of states losing in one
step. It follows that w(L,Xu,Xc) computed at step 7 is the winning valuations for the error function E .
4.3 Back-and-forth
In Algorithm 5, we interleave the analysis of the global game (with objective Λ) and the analysis of
the sub-games. At each iteration, we extend the losing states u(L) by one step, by applying once the
upre operator. We then consider each sub-game, and check whether the new set u′(L) of losing states
(projected on the sub-game), changes the local winning states. Here, pi(L) is this projection on the local
state-space of sub-game i. We update the strategies λi of the sub-games when necessary, and restart until
stabilization. Because analyzing the sub-games is often more efficient than analyzing the global game,
this algorithm improves over Algorithm 3 in some cases (see the experiments’ section). A similar idea
was used in [10] for the problem of synthesis from LTL specifications.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 5 computes the winning valuations of the given AIG game.
Proof. Let W (L) denote the set of winning states of the game G. We consider the following invariant.
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},W (L)⊆ si(L),
err⊆ u′(L)⊆ ¬W (L). (2)
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Algorithm 5: comp_3(〈L,Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈L〉)
1 {e1, . . . ,en} := decompose( ferr); /* Formulas ei(L,Xu,Xc) s.t. ferr ≡∨1≤i≤n ei */
2 for 1≤ i≤ n do
3 wi(L,Xu,Xc) := solve_vals(〈coneL(ei),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(ei)[ ferr← ei]〉)↑L,Xu,Xc ;
4 si(L) := solve_states(〈coneL(ei),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(ei)[ ferr← ei]〉)↑L;
5 Λ(L,Xu,Xc) :=
∧
1≤i≤n wi(L,Xu,Xc);
6 G′ := 〈coneL(Λ),Xu,Xc,( fl)l∈coneL(Λ)〉[ ferr←¬Λ];
7 u(L) := 0;
8 u′(L) :=
∨
1≤i≤n¬si(L); /* The union of all the losing states */
9 while u 6= u′ do
10 u(L) := u′(L);
11 u′(L) := u(L)∨upreG′(u);
12 for 1≤ i≤ n do
13 pi(L) := ∀L\coneL(ei) : u′(L); /* Universal projection of latches not present in
local sub-game */
14 if pi∧ si 6= 0 then
15 for l ∈ coneL(pi) do f ′l (L,Xu,Xc) := fl(L,Xu,Xc) ⇓ ¬pi(L) si(L) :=
solve_states(〈Xu,Xc,coneL(pi),( f ′l )l∈coneL(pi)〉[ ferr← pi ↑L,Xu,Xc ])↑L;
16 u′(L) := u′(L)∨¬∧1≤i≤n(si(L) ↓L);
17 return ¬u(L);
In words, in every iteration, u′(L) is contained in the losing valuations of the global game, and each si(L)
contains the winning valuations of Gi.
Initially, by Algorithm 3, W ⊆ si(L) for all i, and we have err ⊆ ¬si(L). So err ⊆ ¬∧i si(L). Thus,
err⊆ u′(L). Moreover, since ∨i¬si(L)⊆ ¬W , we have that u′(L)⊆ ¬W .
Consider now iteration i > 1, and assume the invariant holds at the beginning. u′(L) is updated at
line 11. The property err ⊆ u′(L) ⊆ ¬W still holds by the definition of the upre operation, and by the
fact that the set u′ can only grow at this step (because of the union).
We consider now the for loop, and show that W ⊆ si after each iteration. Assume pi ∩ si 6= /0 since
otherwise si is not modified. By definition pi ⊆ u′ thus pi ⊆¬W . Then the solve function computes the
set of states from which the controller can avoid err∨ pi. Since err∨ pi ⊆ ¬W , we get that si ⊆W . It
follows that ¬∧ni=1 si ⊆ ¬W . Thus, at the last line of the while loop, we have err⊆ u′(L)⊆ ¬W .
Now, line 11 ensures that after iteration i, u′(L) contains the i-th iteration of the upre fixpoint com-
putation. Hence, the test u 6= u′ of the while loop ensures that the while loop terminates with u(L) being
equal to upre∗(G).
5 Experiments
We implemented our algorithms in the synthesis tool AbsSynthe [4]. We compare their running times
against the most efficient algorithm of AbsSynthe that implements a backward fixpoint algorithm.2 This
algorithm was the winner of the 2014 Synthesis Competition synthesis track, and the winner of the
realizability track at the same competition implemented a similar backward algorithm.
Let us first illustrate the advantage of the compositional approach with two examples. In the first
2The new version of AbsSynthe with the implementation of the compositional algorithms can be fetched from https:
//github.com/gaperez64/abssynthe.
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set of benchmarks we consider, the controller is to compute the multiplication of two Boolean matrices
given as (uncontrollable) input. Since each cell of the resulting matrix depends only on a subset of inputs,
namely, on one row and one column, these benchmarks are well adapted for compositional algorithms.
Figure 3 compares the performances of the classical algorithm with Algorithm 3. The classical algorithm
was able to solve 36 instances, while the compositional algorithm solved all 75 instances and was sig-
nificantly faster. The x-axis shows the number of solved benchmarks within the running time given by
the y-axis. The second set of benchmarks we consider consist in a washing system made of n tanks. An
uncontrollable input can request at any time the tank to be activated, at which point the controller should
fill the tank with water, and empty it after at least k steps. Moreover, some subsets of tanks cannot be
filled at the same time, and a light is to be on if at least one tank is filled with water. Note that the control
strategy for each tank is not independent due to mutual exclusion constraints, and to the light indicator.
Algorithm 3 was also more efficient on these benchmarks, as shown on Fig. 4. The classical algorithm
solved 132 benchmarks out of 256, while Alg. 3 solved 152.
Figure 3: Performances for 75 Boolean
matrix multiplication benchmarks for Algo-
rithm 3 and the classical algorithm.
Figure 4: Peformances for the 256 washing
system benchmarks for Algorithm 3 and the
classical algorithm.
We now evaluate all three compositional algorithms and compare them with the classical algorithm
on a large benchmark set of 674 benchmarks. 562 of these benchmarks were provided for the 2014 Syn-
thesis Competition and 105 have been generated by the new version of LTL2AIG [11] which translates
conjunctions of LTL specifications into AIG.3 Among those benchmarks, 351 are decomposable by our
static analysis into at least 2 smaller sub-games. More specifically, the average number of sub-games our
decomposition algorithm outputs is 29; the median is 21.
In general, the performances of the three compositional algorithms can differ, but they are comple-
mentary. Figures 5 to 8 show the performances of the algorithms on several sets of benchmarks. All
benchmarks in Figures 5 and 6 are decomposable. Figure 7 shows all the benchmarks we used and
Figure 8 shows only those benchmarks from last year’s synthesis competition which were based on
specifications of the AMBA arbiter.
Conclusion. Even if AIG synthesis problems are monolithic, the experiments show that our composi-
tional approach was able to solve problems that can not be handled by the monolithic backward algo-
rithm; our compositional algorithms are sometimes much more efficient. There are also examples that
3A collection of benchmarks, including the ones mentioned here, can be fetched from https://github.com/gaperez64/
bench-syntcomp14 and https://github.com/gaperez64/bench-ulb-syntcomp15.
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can be decomposed but which are not solved more efficiently by the compositional algorithms. So, it is
often a good idea to apply all the algorithms in parallel. This portfolio approach improved the perfor-
mance and was able to solve 20 benchmarks that could not be solved by the fastest algorithms of last
year’s reactive synthesis competition.
Figure 5: Performances for 68 load-balancing
benchmarks translated from LTL. The classical al-
gorithm solves 38 benchmarks, comp.1 44, comp.2
45, comp.3 45. In total there are 46 benchmarks
that can be solved. The largest example that can be
solved has 4005 latches and the smallest example
that cannot be solved has 670 latches.
Figure 6: Performances for 46 generalized buffer
benchmarks translated from LTL. The classical al-
gorithm solves 6 benchmarks, comp.1 10, comp.2
15, comp.3 11. In total there are 18 benchmarks
that can be solved. The largest example that can be
solved has 22662 latches and the smallest example
that cannot be solved has 590 latches.
Figure 7: Performances for the 674 benchmarks.
The classical algorithm was able to solve 572
benchmarks. 20 more benchmarks were solved by
one of the three compositional algorithms.
Figure 8: Performances for 108 AMBA bench-
marks. The classical algorithm was able to solve
106 benchmarks, comp.1 84, comp.2 76, comp.3
93.
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